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States Parties in November 2008. Whether or not these coun-
tries were granted an extension, the 15 States Parties that have 
applied still face serious mine problems. The humanitarian and 
financial costs of the remaining landmines are great. 
Not all States Parties with 2009 deadlines will fail to com-
plete clearance on time. For instance, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, 
France, Djibouti, FYR Macedonia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Malawi, Swaziland and Suriname have already fulfilled Article 
5 clearance obligations.4, 11 Deadline extension request notwith-
standing, the Ottawa Convention’s Implementation Support 
Unit reports that two of the 16 remaining parties with obliga-
tions will most likely finish clearance within the specified time: 
Niger and Uganda.11 The countries that have completed their 
obligations demonstrate to the world that it is possible to be-
come mine-free within the allotted 10-year period.
See Endnotes, page 112
This article was researched and written prior to 9MSP. The 
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The Article 5 Extension 
Request Process
by Tamar Gabelnick 
[ International Campaign to Ban Landmines ]
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was very specific in saying that there were to be no 
exceptions to the 10-year deadline placed in the Ottawa Convention.1 However, with the Convention’s 
first mine-clearance deadline quickly approaching in 2009, at least 15 countries have found they 
may have bitten off more than they can chew. Or have they? 
resources used to clear their land, since the mined areas were 
fenced off and did not pose a threat to human life.19 According to 
an article by the Falkland Islands News Network in 2008, how-
ever, it was wrongly reported previously that the inhabitants 
were against demining because they didn’t want lots of strang-
ers on the Islands while demining was being done; “[f]ew peo-
ple would object to the positive [e]ffect on the economy if a large 
number of people came to help with demining.”20 The United 
Kingdom has requested a deadline extension of 10 years to clear 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.18 At the Intersessional Standing 
Committee Meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 June 2008, the 
United Kingdom stated, “Let there be no doubt that the [United 
Kingdom] takes all its obligations under the Ottawa Convention 
extremely seriously.”21 The United Kingdom explained that un-
dertaking demining operations in the Falklands could have neg-
ative environmental and socioeconomic consequences.21 
Denmark. Most of the landmines in Denmark have been 
cleared, and only a small mined area remains in the marshes and 
dunes of the peninsula of Skallingen, left behind from World 
War II. Authorities in Denmark report that the remote area has 
been fenced and no mine-related casualties have been recorded 
since 1946. In its deadline-extension request, Denmark claims 
that the delicate nature of the environment of Skallingen has 
prevented it from moving forward with clearance operations. 
Denmark states that clearance operations would risk “irrepara-
ble damage” to the environment without careful planning.22 
Venezuela. Although it became party to the Ottawa Conven-
tion in 1999, according to the Landmine Monitor, Venezuela is 
still using AP mines and expects to miss its 2009 deadline. In 
2007, Venezuela stated that it continues to employ AP mines to 
protect its naval bases from Colombian insurgents. Only a small 
amount of mine contamination remains, but Venezuela submit-
ted a deadline extension request.23 
Looking Ahead
The Ottawa Convention has certainly been a powerful force for 
mine action in the international community. Since the entry into 
force of the Convention, production of anti-personnel mines has 
decreased and the trade of AP mines is almost non-existent. Mil-
lions of mines have been destroyed, and hundreds of square kilo-
meters of land have been freed of landmine contamination. Indeed, 
the Ottawa Convention has been called a “success in progress,”24 
and 156 states have become parties to it, pledging to never use, pro-
duce, transfer, develop, retain or stockpile anti-personnel mines.25
The Convention has been successful, but it risks losing its effica-
cy because it appears that States Parties are not taking their obliga-
tions seriously enough, whether or not that may be the case. 
Tamar Gabelnick of the ICBL believes that some countries need 
to rethink their approach to their Article 5 obligations. “For some 
countries, there needs to be a much greater effort on the part of 
the national authorities to prioritize clearance and work more effi-
ciently. Though the work is always challenging, where there is a will, 
there is a way.” 4, 5 She recommends that those parties make more of 
an effort to mobilize resources to get the work done as soon as pos-
sible. Other parties do not have accurate estimates of the contami-
nation level. According to the ICBL, such parties should conduct 
Technical and non-Technical Surveys first to determine the scope of 
the problem. Countries will then be able to develop national mine-
action strategies better after assessing the situation.5
It is not guaranteed that all States Parties that apply for ex-
tensions will receive them. The decision for each State Party that 
requested an extension was made during the 9th Meeting of the 
When the Ottawa Convention was being negotiated in 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines called for a text with “no exceptions, no reservations, 
and no loopholes.” The result was a treaty that was remarkably 
simple and straightforward, including with regards to mine clear-
ance. Under Article 5, mine-affected States Parties have a clear 
duty to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon 
as possible, but no later than 10 years after joining the treaty. The 
link between the treaty’s humanitarian and 
disarmament objectives is equally clear; the 
sooner the mines are taken out of the ground 
and destroyed, the sooner people can farm the 
land, use grazing pastures, gather wood, walk 
to markets and schools, and engage in count-
less other essential activities safely again. The 
longer it takes to clear mined areas along bor-
ders or around security installations, the longer 
a State Party may be continuing to make mili-
tary or strategic use of the mines. 
Despite the urgent need to remove em-
placed mines for humanitarian and/or dis-
armament purposes, there is a possibility of 
requesting one or more extensions to the 10-
year deadline. Mine-affected states that be-
came parties to the Convention in 1999 face 
their mine-clearance deadlines in 2009, and 
those that do not expect to finish on time 
were required to request an extension at the 
9th Meeting of the States Parties in November 
2008. Fifteen countries, or about two-thirds of 
the original group with 2009 deadlines, will 
seek such an extension.2 The extension-request 
process has therefore been one of the hot topics of 2008 as States 
Parties and other interested actors grappled with how to handle 
the requests in a way that would respect the intent of the treaty 
and set the best possible precedent for future requests. 
The History of the Extension-request Process
The extension-request story does not begin with the 2008 
meeting, however, but rather in 1997, when the Ottawa Con-
vention was drafted. During the negotiations, states, the ICBL, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross and other par-
ticipants discussed at length the question of how many years 
States Parties should be given to clear mined areas, or indeed 
whether there should be a deadline at all.3 It was eventually rec-
ognized that without the impetus of a legally binding deadline, 
the clearance work could drag on indefinitely, which would not 
be in keeping with the convention’s intent. 
At the same time, states understood that in some cases—
because of the sheer quantity of mined areas or other extraordi-
nary circumstances—certain mine-affected states would need 
more than 10 years to clear their land. The original proposed 
text, put forward by the ICRC, was that the extension should be 
“the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the extension ex-
ceed five years.”4 Ultimately, the text was changed to allow for up 
to 10 additional years, which would be renewable. States Parties 
requesting more time would have to provide a detailed rationale 
for the extension, and other States Parties must assess and vote 
on the request. The understanding remained, however, that such 
extensions should be the exception, not the rule.
The extension issue was then put aside for many years while 
States Parties focused on how to complete mine-clearance 
Deminers preparing for a “handover ceremony” in yemen.ALL pHoTos CouRTesy of THe AuTHoR
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obligations as efficiently and safely as possible. It resurfaced 
in preparation for the 7th Meeting of States Parties, which took 
place 18–22 September 2006 in Geneva, when States Parties 
developed mechanisms both to guide the requesting states in 
the preparation of the requests and to assist the other States 
Parties to analyze the requests. The ICBL and the ICRC, in 
particular, encouraged the devel-
opment of such mechanisms in 
order to ensure that States Parties 
took seriously both the duty to 
diligently prepare requests and to 
thoroughly assess and make an in-
formed decision on them.5 With-
out such safeguards in place, the 
concern was that granting an ex-
tension would be only a formality, 
which could seriously undermine 
respect for the initial deadline. 
Easy extension approvals could 
also encourage some states to postpone mine clearance indefi-
nitely since a state could seemingly ask for more than one ex-
tension without repercussions.
At the 7MSP, States Parties developed a voluntary template 
to help the requesting states satisfy the treaty requirements 
while providing sufficient information for other States Parties 
to review the requests thoroughly and vote on the outcome.6 
It was hoped that the template would serve another impor-
tant goal, namely to encourage requesting states to take care-
ful stock of what had they had achieved to date, what remained 
to be done, and how they planned to finish their obligations as 
quickly as possible. 
States Parties also agreed at the 7MSP to assign responsi-
bility to a small group of states to carry out an initial analysis 
of the requests. Not all states would have the time or capaci-
ty to conduct a thorough review of what would involve lengthy 
and technical requests. This idea turned out to be especially pre-
scient in a year with 15 requests, several over 100 pages long. It 
was also noted that this group—comprised of the co-chairs and 
co-rapporteurs of the Convention’s Standing Committees plus 
the President of the MSP—should be able to call on outside ex-
pertise to help them with the technical, legal or diplomatic el-
ements of the requests. This formulation was a compromise on 
the original idea put forward by the ICBL and others for a group 
of experts to assess the requests. 
The treaty’s Implementation Support Unit was instructed to 
assist states to develop their requests with the overarching goal 
of eliciting “realistic, but not unambitious” requests.7 States were 
also instructed to provide a draft request nine months ahead of 
the MSP or Review Conference where it would be considered 
in order to give those states doing the initial analysis enough 
time to do so.
In summary, the extension-request process was developed 
to complement simple treaty language with additional infor-
mal mechanisms with a view to promote effective treaty im-
plementation. The importance of this particular mechanism 
cannot be understated—without the means to ensure the thor-
ough preparation and evaluation of the requests, any state 
seeking to avoid its Article 5 obligations by delaying them in-
definitely could do so without hindrance. As Croatia stated at 
the 7MSP, the extension provision should serve as “a vehicle for 
the full implementation of the Convention and not a means for 
getting around it.”8 
The Current State of Play
Again, the decisions of the 7MSP have proven significant 
given what has transpired over the past two years. It seems that 
several States Parties were indeed interested in using the Con-
vention’s extension provision to prolong clearance for many 
years or even to postpone it indefinitely. As the ICBL said at the 
Intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, if the 
international community’s intention—as reflected in the Nairobi 
Action Plan—was for “few, if any states” to ask for an extension, 
then we have collectively and by a disappointing margin failed to 
meet our goal. As noted above, at the 9th Meeting of States Par-
ties 15 states submitted requests for an extension, 10 of them for 
periods of five years or longer. 
There are certainly some States Parties requesting exten-
sions, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Thailand, that 
had very large suspected hazardous areas and were generally ex-
pected to need more time to demine them. Others, like Denmark, 
Jordan, Mozambique and Nicaragua, should have been able to 
complete their obligations on time, but delays in commencing 
effective planning and clearance and/or management issues 
(among other reasons) forced them to ask for additional time. 
Technical difficulties—such as demining areas with deep, shift-
ing sands in Yemen—have been a factor in many other requests, 
and funding shortfalls were cited by most states as an important 
reason for needing more time. Countries like Senegal and Chad 
have also been hampered by ongoing hostilities, though in the 
case of Senegal additional administrative delays have prevented 
earlier clearance of areas local experts already deem were safe 
to clear.
The most troubling aspect about the set of extension requests 
in 2008 is not just the number of states seeking a request, but 
also the number of those—including Ecuador, Peru, the United 
Kingdom and Venezuela—that should not have needed to make 
a request and certainly not for the length of time requested. Each 
offers its own set of special circumstances to support its request, 
but none justifies the length of time requested. Ecuador and Peru, 
each with less than 500,000 square meters (123 acres) remaining 
to clear, cite difficult climatic, geographic and logistical issues 
in demining their mountainous border as reasons for requesting 
eight more years.9 But Ecuador plans to increase significantly its 
number of deminers and may be able to sharply reduce its esti-
mate of suspected hazardous areas through Technical Survey. Its 
request does not reflect these developments and in any case, it 
simply lacks ambition. 
Peru cleared 300,000 square meters (74 acres) in the bor-
der area in 1999–2000, making one wonder why they need an 
additional eight years to clear the 192,000 square meters (47 
acres) remaining in that region. Peru plans to clear the re-
maining 335,000 square meters (83 acres) of contaminated 
land in the interior of the country by 2010. Once its police 
forces finish demining the other sites in 2010, Peru will have a 
large force of trained deminers capable of helping in the bor-
der region. 
The United Kingdom, with responsibility for clearing the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands,10 cites the sovereignty dispute with 
Argentina and the difficult geographical conditions as reasons 
that it has not yet cleared any mined areas. But the addition-
al reasons for delays, which the United Kingdom openly ex-
presses, are the supposed reluctance on the part of the islanders 
to remove the mines and the high cost involved in bringing in 
and supporting demining personnel in such an isolated spot. 
In other words, the United Kingdom has demonstrated why it 
is unmotivated to begin operations, which is also reflected in 
its failure to provide a starting date for operations, a detailed 
timeframe, or a budget allocated to its 10-year request, essen-
tial components of an extension request that all the other states 
have managed to provide.
Finally, Venezuela is seeking an additional five years to clear 
13 small, mined areas around six of its naval bases. None of the 
reasons it cites for the delay—difficult terrain, annual flood-
ing, problems with access and the need to provide security to 
deminers from Colombian guerrillas across the river—should 
have prevented Venezuela from completing the demining pro-
cess long ago. The problem is small, contained and not tech-
nically challenging outside of the flooding season. What has 
prevented Venezuela from completing its Article 5 obligations, 
to its own admission in past years, is that Venezuela has been 
relying on the minefields to protect the naval bases from cross-
border attacks and wanted to wait for an alternative defense sys-
tem to be installed before taking the mines out of the ground. In 
other words, Venezuela has been gaining active military benefit 
from the mined areas, which is clearly a violation of Article 1’s 
ban on the use of landmines.
With perhaps the exception of those states experiencing 
ongoing conflict or having an extremely large initial estimate 
of contaminated areas, the reasons mentioned above are not 
the extraordinary circumstances originally envisaged when 
the extension provision was created. But one could consider 
that the first set of states with obligations under the Ottawa Con-
vention had more of a learning curve than those that joined 
later, as demining methods, structures and technologies have 
developed significantly over the past many years. At the very 
least, several of these states have used the process to under-
take careful reflection of past and anticipated activities and 
have developed plans that are well-thought-through and rea-
sonably ambitious.
Analyzing the Requests
Since February 2008, the group of states named in the 7MSP 
decision—sometimes referred to as the “Analyzing Group”—has 
been spending many hours studying and discussing the long, 
detailed requests. They have sought 
expert input from the ICBL, ICRC, 
the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining, the United 
Nations Development Programme and 
other organizations, albeit on a sur-
prisingly limited basis given the lack 
of technical and country-specific ex-
pertise of the diplomats assessing the 
requests. Members met with most re-
questing states at the Intersessional 
Standing Committee meetings in June 
2008 to discuss the requests in detail. 
They asked many countries for addi-
tional information or clarification and 
sent a few back to the drawing board 
for more work. They have even strong-
ly encouraged a small number of states 
to revisit the period of time requested.
Also at the June 2008 ISC meet-
ings, a few Latin American states 
stressed the importance of examining 
each country’s extension request on 
its own merits and in relation only to 
the specific conditions in that country. 
While a comparative approach might bring to light the relative 
effort made by one state next to another, even taken in isolation, 
it is hard to understand how some states plan to take so much 
time to achieve so little. 
Nor is it fair to those states that have done the most work to 
put so little pressure on other states to be equally efficient. A dis-
tinction must be made between those countries that have dili-
gently tried to implement their Article 5 obligations and those 
that have put in a fraction of the resources or achieved a frac-
tion of the results over the same time period. There is clearly a 
continuum between the best and worst cases, and the Analyz-
ing Group has engaged with most of the countries in order to 
encourage better planning and greater efficiency. But if States 
Parties treat all cases with kid gloves, what would be the po-
litical “carrot” for those that have led the way in mine action? 
And more importantly, what would be the “stick” for those that 
have flagrantly disregarded the Convention’s obligation to act as 
quickly as possible? 
What was to be decided at the 9MSP this year was there-
fore crucial for the integrity of Article 5. Not only would these 
decisions  show how States Parties would treat cases of virtual 
non-compliance with Article 5.1, but they would also send a 
…the extension request process was de-
veloped to complement simple treaty 
language with additional informal mech-
anisms with a view to promote effective 
treaty implementation.
Communities have lived too long with the menace of mines. photo taken in Bosnia.
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The Case of Mozambique
With the impending 2009 Ottawa Convention1 deadline quickly approaching, it has become clear 
that Mozambique will not be able to complete their required obligations without an extension. 
Dwindling funding, inadequate resources and the challenge of other internal problems have 
delayed the mine-action progress, but what will be the solution?
by Maria Isabel Macedo dos santos [ Instituto Nacional de Desminagem Mozambique ]
Demining work in progress in Mafambisse, sofala province, Mozambique.
pHoTo CouRTesy of THe AuTHoR
signal to states with deadlines in the coming years on how their 
own cases will be handled. The precedent set at the 9MSP would 
either discourage states from presenting unjustified extension 
requests or it would let them know that “anything goes.” 
The views put forward by the Analyzing Group were criti-
cally important because they provided the basis on which other 
states took their decisions at the 9MSP. Despite the importance 
of their role, a small number of states in the Analyzing Group 
encouraged a passive and uncritical role for the group, report-
edly politicizing and personalizing the workings of the group. 
They also fought hard to keep the group’s work closed and se-
cretive, which is highly unusual for the work of the Ottawa 
Convention, born out of a close collaboration between states 
and nongovernmental partners. Despite these constraints, the 
group managed to produce several final analyses with useful 
constructive criticism. But the analyses clearly applied different 
standards to different states, showing the regional bias of some 
Analyzing Group members. Perhaps the most positive outcome 
of the group’s work was the proactive engagement with the re-
questing states  that in some cases led to new requests reflecting 
improved planning.
The 9MSP and the End Game
After the analyses were given to  the other States Parties, it 
was their turn to reflect on and guide the outcome at the 9MSP. 
The treaty says that the MSP, or Review Conference, shall “as-
sess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States 
Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for 
an extension period.”1 The question was therefore how states 
would react to those requests that did not merit approval as 
presented. As noted above, the first action was for the Analyz-
ing Group to try to get certain countries to amend the requests, 
including the amount of time requested. This approach was the 
most logical and diplomatic way of dealing with the problem, 
and it worked in a few cases. States did, of course, have the op-
tion to turn down the request, but that would mean that the 
country would be in violation of the treaty when its deadline 
passes, and therefore, States Parties were reluctant to consider 
this possibility. 
 The solution proposed by the President of the 9MSP, Am-
bassador Jurg Streuli of Switzerland, was for states to grant all 
requests as drafted, but with comments from States Parties that 
in certain cases encouraged the country to complete the demin-
ing work faster than planned and/or to clarify other outstand-
ing issues of concern in the requests. 
This approach was satisfactory for most cases, but the ICBL 
was still calling for States Parties to turn down requests from 
any state that had no plans to begin demining operations before 
its original 10-year deadline, namely the United Kingdom and 
Venezuela. States Parties chose to focus their criticism on the 
United Kingdom, which, unlike Venezuela, presented a request 
for the maximum 10 years with no timeline or budget for begin-
ning, let alone finishing, its demining duties. In essence, they 
were asking for carte blanche to implement Article 5 if and when 
it liked. States Parties understood that such a request would be 
highly detrimental to the treaty and therefore spoke out publicly 
and privately against it. The United Kingdom tried to calm its 
critics by announcing that it would launch a tender in 2009 to 
begin demining three of its 117 mined areas and by arguing that 
a feasibility study with a range of vague demining options actu-
ally constituted a concrete plan. 
In the end, States Parties’ dissatisfaction with these small 
steps coupled with their continued concern about the impli-
cations of a “no” vote for the treaty led to a compromise out-
come. The United Kingdom’s request, along with the other 14 
requesting parties, was approved without a vote, and each was 
accompanied by comments in the form of an MSP decision. In 
the United Kingdom’s language, it agreed to return to States 
Parties within 1.5 years with more details about its work plan, 
to provide regular progress reports, and to consider on an an-
nual basis if it would be possible to reduce the time necessary 
to finish its demining duties. States Parties also encouraged 
the United Kingdom—along with Ecuador, Peru and Senegal—
to finish demining more quickly than initially planned. The 
decision for Venezuela was the weakest, commenting simply 
that it “may find itself in a situation wherein it could complete 
implementation before October 2014 and that this could ben-
efit the Convention.” Other useful comments in the analyses 
did not make it into the final decisions because the concerned 
states were given the chance to approve the decision language.   
Conclusion
Despite some shortcomings, the first extension request 
decision process produced a solid foundation on which the 
future implementation of Article 5 can rest. States Parties that 
asked for more time to demine were challenged to show that 
they were truly seeking the minimum time necessary to com-
plete the work. The process could still use improvement—to 
prevent regional discrepancies in the treatment of requests 
for example—but overall States Parties confirmed that there 
will be no rubber-stamping of requests and made it clear that 
the duty to demine “as soon as possible” also applies to the 
extension period. 
See Endnotes, page 112
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Adecade has passed since the signing of the Ottawa Con-vention and the commitment of the States Parties to work toward eradicating landmines in all affected coun-
tries. In this period, significant progress on landmine clearance 
and victim assistance has been registered, and significant areas 
have been cleared and released to the communities. 
The Progress
Mozambique signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention, be-
coming a State Party in March 1999. In May 1999, Mozambique 
hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in its capital, Maputo. 
In compliance with Ottawa Convention Article 4, Mozambique 
destroyed its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles in February 
2003 and has been conducting clearance activities to meet the 
March 2009 deadline.
Like many affected countries, Mozambique has endured war 
and destabilization for more than 30 years, leaving landmines 
and unexploded ordnance spread all over the country. In 1992 
when the government and the then-rebel movement Resistência 
Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) signed a peace agreement 
in Rome, the United Nations dispatched its peacekeeping mis-
sion, and one of its mandates included demining operations. 
Mozambique has been demining its countryside since then.
The Problem
Mozambique faces many other challenges, including poverty, 
natural disasters and endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The 
majority of its population is rural and, consequently, the pres-
ence of landmines and other UXO constitutes a major impedi-
ment to the economic and social development of affected areas.
Fifteen years of demining activities have elapsed, surveys 
have been conducted and thousands of square meters of land 
have been released to the people. A recent baseline assessment, 
carried out by The HALO Trust in the remaining affected areas, 
has shown that there is work to be done to comply with Article 
52 of the Ottawa Convention. The 2009 Convention deadline is 
approaching, and the landmine problem is far from solved. Out 
of the 36 States Parties with deadlines for 2009 and 2010, only 10 
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